INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM AND THE NO-DEFEATER CONDITION

Author: BERGMANN M.

Source: Synthese, Volume 110, Number 3, March 1997 , pp. 399-417(19)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of `internal' here? And of which conditions of which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subject's belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Notre Dame Notre Dame IN 46556 U.S.A.

Publication date: 1997-03-01