Qualia and Vagueness

Author: Everett A.

Source: Synthese, Volume 106, Number 2, February 1996 , pp. 205-226(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: #

Publication date: 1996-02-01