Gricean Belief Change
Source: Studia Logica, Volume 79, Number 1, February 2005 , pp. 97-113(17)
Abstract:One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Department of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, AC, Canada, V5A 1S6, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org 2: Department of Computing, Division of Information and Communication Sciences, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW, 2109, Australia, Email: email@example.com 3: National ICT Australia and School of Computer Science and Engineering, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia, Email: Maurice.Pagnucco@nicta.com.au
Publication date: February 1, 2005