Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason
Author: Olsson, E.J.
Source: Studia Logica, Volume 73, Number 2, 2003 , pp. 219-240(22)
Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Fachbereich Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, Postfach 5560 D 21, 78434 Konstanz, Germany, Erik.Olsson@uni-konstanz.de
Publication date: 2003