Peirce on Educational Beliefs

Author: Strand, Torill

Source: Studies in Philosophy and Education, Volume 24, Numbers 3-4, July 2005 , pp. 255-276(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism.

Keywords: Peirce; education; educational beliefs; scientific ethos; pragmatism; fallibilism; abduction

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11217-005-3848-x

Affiliations: 1: University of Bergen, Department of Education and Health Promotion, N-5020 Bergen, Norway, Email: Torill.Strand@iuh.uib.no

Publication date: 2005-07-01

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