Lobbying, corruption and political influence

Authors: Campos, Nauro; Giovannoni, Francesco¹

Source: Public Choice, Volume 131, Numbers 1-2, April 2007 , pp. 1-21(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Conventional wisdom is that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for almost 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes; (b) firm size, age and ownership as well as political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying is a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in less developed countries.

Keywords: Lobbying; Corruption; Transition; Institutions

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9102-4

Affiliations: 1: Email: francesco.giovannoni@bristol.ac.uk

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