Public Choice

Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election
pp. 251-266(16)
Author: Binder, John

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world
pp. 267-292(26)
Authors: Bjørnskov, Christian; Dreher, Axel; Fischer, Justina

Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence
pp. 293-310(18)
Authors: Patty, John; Weber, Roberto

Public versus private production and economies of scale
pp. 311-328(18)
Authors: Christoffersen, Henrik; Paldam, Martin; Würtz, Allan

Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment
pp. 329-335(7)
Authors: Münster, Johannes

Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
pp. 337-346(10)
Authors: Pecorino, Paul; Temimi, Akram

A sheriff, two bullets and three problems
pp. 347-362(16)
Author: Felgenhauer, Mike

Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?
pp. 363-380(18)
Author: Schwarz, Peter

Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy
pp. 381-393(13)
Authors: Fredriksson, Per; Wollscheid, Jim

1 dictator = 2 voters
pp. 395-400(6)
Author: Quesada, Antonio

A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union
pp. 401-436(36)
Authors: Lagona, Francesco; Padovano, Fabio

Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance
pp. 437-456(20)
Authors: Belova, Eugenia; Lazarev, Valery

Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply
pp. 457-470(14)
Authors: Brennan, Geoffrey; Brooks, Michael

Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
pp. 471-493(23)
Authors: Azfar, Omar; Nelson, William

Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth)
pp. 495-497(3)
Author: Gardner, Roy

Gordon Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005, 153 + vii pp., 2005. USD 75.00 (cloth)
pp. 499-501(3)
Author: Sutter, Daniel

Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising
pp. 503-503(1)
Authors: Mixon, Franklin; Crocker, Chena; Black, H.