Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?
Author: Coffman, E.
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 154, Number 2, June 2011 , pp. 285-300(16)
Abstract:This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism. In Sect. 2, I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown (2008a). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne (2004), Brown (2008b), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA’s least secure premises. In Sect. 4, I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA from the objection developed in Sect. 3.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, The University of Tennessee, 801 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: June 1, 2011