Singular thoughts and singular propositions
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 154, Number 2, June 2011 , pp. 205-222(18)
Abstract:A singular thought about an object o is one that is directly about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is ontologically dependent on o. One account of the nature of singular thought exploits a Russellian Structured Account of Propositions, according to which contents are represented by means of structured n-tuples of objects, properties, and functions. A proposition is singular, according to this framework, if and only if it contains an object as a constituent. One advantage of the framework of Russellian Structured propositions is that it promises to provide a metaphysical basis for the notion of a singular thought about an object, grounding it in terms of constituency. In this paper, we argue that the attempt to ground the peculiar features of singular thoughts in terms of metaphysical constituency fails, and draw some consequences of our discussion for other debates.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA, Email: email@example.com 2: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: 2011-06-01