Warrant is unique

Author: Bailey, Andrew

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 149, Number 3, July 2010 , pp. 297-304(8)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn't: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. Given these revisions, I argue that there is, after all, exactly one warrant condition.

Keywords: Warrant; Huemer; Merricks; Plantinga; Knowledge; Epistemology

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9350-5

Affiliations: 1: University of Notre Dame, South Bend, USA, Email: wrathius@gmail.com

Publication date: 2010-07-01