Author: Hellie, Benj

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 134, Number 3, June 2007 , pp. 289-324(36)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

I argue against such “Higher-Order Intentionalist” theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the ground that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than “direct”, like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness takes the relation of awareness to be nonintentional.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-0241-0

Affiliations: 1: Email: hellie@utsc.utoronto.ca

Publication date: 2007-06-01

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