A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect

Author: Delaney, Neil¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 134, Number 2, May 2007 , pp. 103-110(8)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The purpose of this note is to tidy up some matters concerning ascriptions of intention and the employment of the doctrine of double effect (henceforth DDE). I first argue that Jonathan Bennett's efforts to show that DDE is a foolish doctrine are unsatisfactory. I then consider a puzzle of Mark Johnston's that seems to pose a problem for the defender of DDE. I turn to possible solutions to the puzzle, criticize one, and then offer the one I find most appealing. I then show how my proposal for employing DDE enables it to make some distinctions between courses of conduct without issuing foolish pronouncements about moral permissibility.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9086-z

Affiliations: 1: Email: Ncfd22@georgetown.edu