Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability

Author: Pelling, Charlie

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 134, Number 2, May 2007 , pp. 211-234(24)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar `fineness of grain' objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim -the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive -entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5338-y

Affiliations: 1: Email: charlespelling@hotmail.com

Publication date: 2007-05-01