@article {Parent:April 2007:0031-8116:411,
	author = "Parent, T.",
	title = "Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "133",
	year = "April 2007",
	abstract = "Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts.",
	pages = "411-424(14)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000133/00000003/00006327"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11098-005-6327-x"
}