Author: Parent, T.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 133, Number 3, April 2007 , pp. 411-424(14)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-6327-x

Affiliations: 1: Email: tparent@email.unc.edu

Publication date: 2007-04-01

Related content

• In this: publication
• By this: publisher
• In this Subject: Philosophy
• By this author: Parent, T.

Website © Publishing Technology. Article copyright remains with the publisher, society or author(s) as specified within the article.

• Terms and conditions
• Privacy policy
• Information for advertisers