Against relativism
Author: Zimmerman, Aaron
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 133, Number 3, April 2007 , pp. 313-348(36)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4604-3
Affiliations: 1: Email: azimmerman@philosophy.ucsb.edu
Publication date: 2007-04-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Zimmerman, Aaron

Shopping cart
Receive new issue alert