Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions

Author: Clarke, R.¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 133, Number 3, April 2007 , pp. 391-409(19)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka's toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as commanded. Here it is argued that ordinary agents in ordinary cases can have justifying reasons for deciding that are not and will not be justifying reasons for doing what, in making those decisions, they come to intend to do. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the functions of decision-making.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-0929-1

Affiliations: 1: Email: rkclarke@fsu.edu

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