Anti-realism and Epistemic Accessibility

Author: Jenkins, C.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 132, Number 3, February 2007 , pp. 525-551(27)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

I argue that Fitch's `paradox of knowability' presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist's commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2533-9

Affiliations: 1: Email: csj6@st-andrews.ac.uk

Publication date: 2007-02-01