Anti-realism and Epistemic Accessibility
Author: Jenkins, C.
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 132, Number 3, February 2007 , pp. 525-551(27)
Abstract:I argue that Fitch's `paradox of knowability' presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist's commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2007-02-01