Necessity and Apriority

Author: Barnes, Gordon¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 132, Number 3, February 2007 , pp. 495-523(29)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view - call it the neo-classical view - knowledge of a necessary truth always depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge. According to the rival view - call it the neoempiricist view - our knowledge of necessity is sometimes broadly empirical. In this paper I present and defend an argument against the neo-empiricist view. I argue that knowledge of the necessity of a necessary truth could not be broadly empirical.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-2531-y

Affiliations: 1: Email: gbarnes@brockport.edu

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