Two dogmas of metaethics

Author: Bloomfield, P.¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 132, Number 3, February 2007 , pp. 439-466(28)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The two dogmas at issue are the Humean dogma that “`is' statements do not imply `ought' statements” and the Kantian dogma that “`ought' statements imply `can'” statements. The extant literature concludes these logically contradict each other. On the contrary, it is argued here that while there is no derivable formal contradiction, the juxtaposition of the dogmas manifests a philosophical disagreement over how to understand the logic of prescriptions. This disagreement bears on how to understand current metaethical debate between realists and non-realists about morality in a way not heretofore investigated. The conclusion is that realists have the resources to account for both dogmas, while non-realists, if they strictly adhere to the “is”/“ought” gap, cannot give an adequate account of why “ought” implies “can”.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-2509-9

Affiliations: 1: Email: phsb@uconn.edu

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