Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction

Author: Horgan, Terry¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 131, Number 1, October 2006 , pp. 157-183(27)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-5987-x

Affiliations: 1: Email: thorgan@e-mail.arizona.edu

Links for this article

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/klu/phil/2006/00000131/00000001/00005987
http://openurl.ingenta.com/content?genre=article&issn=0031-8116&volume=131&issue=1&spage=157&epage=183
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5987-x