Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism

Author: Melnyk, Andrew

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 131, Number 1, October 2006 , pp. 127-155(29)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5986-y

Affiliations: 1: Email: melnyka@missouri.edu

Publication date: 2006-10-01