@article {Dowell:October 2006:0031-8116:25,
	author = "Dowell, J.",
	title = "The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "131",
	year = "October 2006",
	abstract = "Intuitively, physicalism is the thesis that there's nothing `over and above' the physical. Going beyond this intuitive formulation requires an account of what it is for a property, kind, relation, or object to be a physical one. Here I defend an unfamiliar implementation of the familiar strategy of defining physical properties, etc. as those posited by the complete and ideal physical theory. That implementation ties being a physical theory to being a theory with the hallmarks of scientific theories and then identifies physical theories among the scientific ones by their characteristic subject matter, roughly, the world's relatively fundamental elements. I then argue that, fully fleshed out, such an account is able to satisfy an array of constraints on any account of the physical, as well as avoid a number of prima facie objections, without imposing Wilson's No Fundamental Mentality Constraint.",
	pages = "25-60(36)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2006/00000131/00000001/00005983"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11098-005-5983-1"
}