Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives
Author: Shaver, Robert
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 129, Number 2, May 2006 , pp. 335-347(13)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant's method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant's method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent's own will. I focus on Kant's argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant's argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1646-x
Affiliations: 1: Email: bshaver@cc.umanitoba.ca
Publication date: 2006-05-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Shaver, Robert

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