The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief

Author: Hendricks, Scott

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 129, Number 2, May 2006 , pp. 317-333(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1644-z

Affiliations: 1: Email: shendricks@clarku.edu

Publication date: 2006-05-01

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