Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation
Author: Coates, Allen
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 129, Number 2, May 2006 , pp. 295-315(21)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents' desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1643-0
Affiliations: 1: Email: coatesa@etsu.edu
Publication date: 2006-05-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Coates, Allen

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