Author: Heathwood, Chris

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 128, Number 3, April 2006 , pp. 539-563(25)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one's life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7817-y

Affiliations: 1: Email: heathwood@colorado.edu

Publication date: 2006-04-01

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