Character in Epistemology
Author: Baehr, Jason
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 128, Number 3, April 2006 , pp. 479-514(36)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology. I go on to examine the work of two other virtue epistemologists in light of this challenge and then sketch an alternative approach that reveals how the intellectual virtues might merit a substantial role in epistemology even if not a role in connection with more traditional epistemological projects.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7483-0
Affiliations: 1: Email: jbaehr@lmu.edu
Publication date: 2006-04-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Baehr, Jason

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