@article {Zimmerman:March 2006:0031-8116:337,
	author = "Zimmerman, Aaron",
	title = "Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacockes Criticisms of Constitutivism",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "128",
	year = "March 2006",
	abstract = "Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke's arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism <I>per se</I>, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke's own account of self-knowledge.",
	pages = "337-379(43)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2006/00000128/00000002/00007797"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7797-y"
}