Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem

Author: Gibbons, John

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 397-428(32)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7799-9

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1010 Oldfather Hall, 68588-0321, Lincoln, NE, USA, Email: jgibbons@unl.edu

Publication date: 2005-12-01