Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?

Author: Campbell, Scott1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 375-396(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-7786-1

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK, Email: scott.campbell@nottingham.ac.uk

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