Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?
Author: Campbell, Scott
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 375-396(22)
Abstract:In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: December 1, 2005