Hindriks on Rule-Following*

Author: Haukioja, Jussi¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 2, November 2005 , pp. 219-239(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks’ paper “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following”. Hindriks claims to find room for what he calls a modest solution to the Kripkensteinian problem of rule-following, different from both straight and sceptical solutions. Hindriks criticises Philip Pettit’s “ethocentric” solution and goes on to provide his own, “modest” one. My paper is in two parts. In the first part, I argue that there is no room for a “modest” solution to sceptical problems: depending on how one reads Kripke, Hindriks’ “modest” solution is always going to turn out either straight or sceptical. In the second part, I defend the ethocentric solution against Hindriks’ arguments. In particular, I argue that the topic-neutral specifications of favourable conditions which Pettit uses are superior to Hindriks’ topic-specific ones.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-7818-x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, 20014, Finland, Email: jussi.haukioja@iki.fi

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