Who is Afraid of Epistemologys Regress Problem?
Author: Aikin, Scott
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 2, November 2005 , pp. 191-217(27)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of infinitism consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7803-4
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN, 373240, USA, Email: scott.f.aikin@vanderbilt.edu
Publication date: 2005-11-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Aikin, Scott

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