Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?

Author: Aikin, Scott1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 126, Number 2, November 2005 , pp. 191-217(27)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of “infinitism” consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-7803-4

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN, 373240, USA, Email: scott.f.aikin@vanderbilt.edu

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