Passive Action and Causalism

Author: Zhu J.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 119, Number 3, June 2004 , pp. 295-314(20)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The first half of this paper is an attempt to conceptualize and understand the paradoxical notion of ``passive action''. The strategy is to construe passive action in the context of emotional behavior, with the purpose to establish it as a conceivable and conceptually coherent category. In the second half of this paper, the implications of passive action for causal theories of action are examined. I argue that Alfred Mele's defense of causalism is unsuccessful and that causalism may lack the resource to account for passive action. Following Harry Frankfurt, I suggest an alternative way of understanding the nature of action that can accommodate passive action.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000030433.41964.14

Affiliations: 1: School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19A Yuquan Road, Beijing 100039, P.R. China humanwill@yahoo.ca, Email: humanwill@yahoo.ca

Publication date: 2004-06-01