Defending Double Effect
Author: Hills A.1
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 116, Number 2, November 2003 , pp. 133-152(20)
Publisher: Springer
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Abstract:
According to the doctrine of double effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. It is not difficult to explain why it is bad to intend harm as an end (you have a ``bad attitude'' toward that harm) but it is hard to explain why it is bad to intend harm as a means to some good end. If you intend harm as a means to some good end, you need not have a ``bad attitude'' toward it. I distinguish two ways in which you can treat something that is your chosen means to your ends. You can pursue your ends directly, and treat X as a mere means that you pursue for the sake of your end. Or you can pursue your ends indirectly, and treat X as a ``plan-relative end'' that you pursue for its own sake. I argue that much of the time we pursue our ends indirectly, and treat our means as plan-relative ends. There are significant analogies between intending harm as an end, and intending harm as a plan-relative end. So, under certain circumstances, it is morally worse to intend harm as a means or an end than to foresee bringing about the same amount of harm.Document Type: Research article
Affiliations: 1: Clare College, Cambridge, UK, Email: aes20@hermes.cam.ac.uk
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