Physical Constituents of Qualia

Author: Aranyosi I.1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 116, Number 2, November 2003 , pp. 103-131(29)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism. Problems with a posteriori identity materialism are identified, and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed. The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relation between physical and phenomenal properties. Composition does not seem to be fit as a relation between properties, but I offer a peculiar way to understand property-composition, based on some recent ideas in the literature on ontology. Finally, I propose a materialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resist the attack from conceivability arguments.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: ; aranysoi@email.arizona.edu, Email: fphari01@phd.ceu.hu

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