Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism

Author: Goldberg S.C.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 116, Number 1, 200310 , pp. 53-78(26)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical) knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have said regarding e.g. the compatibility of anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge; and more importantly it contains the crux of a response to McKinsey-style arguments against anti-individualism.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 1427 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506-0027, USA

Publication date: 2003-01-01