Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness

Author: Smilansky S.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 115, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 257-282(26)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel (E-mail: Smilsaul@research.haifa.ac.il)

Publication date: 2003-09-01

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