Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift

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In this Subject: Philosophy
By this author: Moffett M.A.

Author: Moffett M.A.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 115, Number 1, July 2003 , pp. 81-97(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the psgr that p' strongly suggests that `that'-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositional denotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that'-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation of descriptive predication can be introduced in a way that resolves the dilemma without sacrificing the singular term analysis of `that'-clauses.