Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift

Author: Moffett, M.A.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 115, Number 1, July 2003 , pp. 81-97(17)

Publisher: Springer

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The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the ψ that p' strongly suggests that `that'-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositional denotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that'-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation of descriptive predication can be introduced in a way that resolves the dilemma without sacrificing the singular term analysis of `that'-clauses.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Wyoming, 3392 Hoyt Hall, Laramie, WY 82071, USA

Publication date: July 1, 2003

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