Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences

Author: Majors B.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 113, Number 2, March 2003 , pp. 121-152(32)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical naturalism upholding the explanatory integrity of moral facts and properties, and opponents – including both anti-realists and non-naturalistic realists – insisting that such robustly explanatory pretensions as moral theory has be explained away. I propose that the key to solving the problem lies in the question whether instances of moral properties are causally efficacious. It is argued that, given the truth of contemporary ethical naturalism, moral properties are causally efficacious if the properties of the special sciences are. Certain objections are rebutted involving the nature of causation, on the one hand, and putative special features of the moral realm, on the other.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence KS 66045, USA

Publication date: 2003-03-01

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