Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?

Author: Duncan C.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 3, February 2003 , pp. 279-290(12)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascal's Wager. In particular, he argues that ``skeptical agnostics'' – those whose probability for God's existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated as ``second-order'' cases of choice under uncertainty, with the result that belief in God is the favored option in a very wide range of cases.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy and Religion, Ithaca College, G9 Dillingham, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA, E-mail: cduncan@ithaca.edu

Publication date: 2003-02-01