A Metacompatibilist Account of Free Will: Making Compatibilists and Incompatibilists More Compatible
Author: Waller, B.N.
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 3, February 2003 , pp. 209-224(16)
The debate over free will has pitted libertarian insistence on open alternatives against the compatibilist view that authentic commitments can preserve free will in a determined world. A second schism in the free will debate sets rationalist belief in the centrality of reason against nonrationalists who regard reason as inessential or even an impediment to free will. By looking deeper into what motivates each of these perspectives it is possible to find common ground that accommodates insights from all those competing views. The resulting metacompatibilist view of free will bridges some of the differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists as well as between rationalists and nonrationalists, and results in a free will theory that is both more philosophically inclusive and more firmly connected to contemporary research in psychology and biology.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH 44555, USA, E-mail: email@example.com
Publication date: February 2003