Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency
Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 2, January 2003 , pp. 135-145(11)
We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanations of free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offers are neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns to reasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P.O. Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627-0078, USA E-mails: firstname.lastname@example.org 2: Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P.O. Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627-0078, USA E-mails: email@example.com
Publication date: January 1, 2003