Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency

Authors: Feldman R.¹; Buckareff A.A.²

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 2, January 2003 , pp. 135-145(11)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanations of free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offers are neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns to reasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P.O. Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627-0078, USA E-mails: feldman@philosophy.rochester.edu 2: Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P.O. Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627-0078, USA E-mails: bkrf@mail.rochester.edu

Publication date: 2003-01-01