Why the handicapped child case is hard

Author: Parsons J.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 2, January 2003 , pp. 147-162(16)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identity problem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that a moral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'') is inadequate.

I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identity problem which do not bear directly on person-affecting morality as I understand it. And finally, I describe a respect in which the handicapped child case is puzzling and counter-intuitive, even on the supposition that it is a case of harmless wrongdoing. I conclude that the case is ``hard'': it will take more than the rejection of person-affecting morality to remove its puzzling character.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, KY16 9AJ, UK E-mail: jp30@st-and.ac.uk

Publication date: 2003-01-01