Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth

Author: McGrath M.1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 112, Number 1, January 2003 , pp. 47-67(11)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it needn't be explained by deflationists. If it does, it can be explained.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA E-mail: mcgrathma@missouri.edu

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