The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes

Author: Kelly T.¹

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 110, Number 2, August 2002 , pp. 163-196(34)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case of belief have important implications for the way we should think about the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes, such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally, I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issues has given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Harvard Society of Fellows/University of Notre Dame, Cambridge, USA, E-mail: tpkelly@fas.harvard.edu

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