Skepticism about Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits

Author: Skidmore J.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 109, Number 2, May 2002 , pp. 121-141(21)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Transcendental arguments offer a particularly powerful strategy for combating skepticism. Such arguments, after all, attempt to show that a particular skepticism is not simply mistaken but inconsistent or self-refuting. While thus tempting to philosophers struggling with skepticism of various sorts, the bold conclusions of these arguments have long rendered them suspicious in the eyes of many. In fact, in a famous paper from 1968 Barry Stroud develops what is often taken to be a decisive case against transcendental arguments in general.

Recent work in the area of practical reason, however, suggests that such arguments still have their defenders. Theorists such as James Dreier and Christine Korsgaard have relied explicitly on transcendental arguments to justify certain principles of practical reason. Can such arguments overcome Stroud's objection? In what follows, I argue that they can. However effective Stroud's general criticism may be in other areas, it does not apply in the realm of practical reason. Nevertheless, there are strict limits on how far transcendental arguments can take us. In particular, despite Korsgaard's efforts, they cannot succeed in establishing a rational foundation for morality.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of English and Philosophy, Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209-8056, USA E-mail: skidjame@isu.edu

Publication date: 2002-05-01