Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move

Author: Jaworski W.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 108, Number 3, April 2002 , pp. 298-308(11)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay of anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctions of physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. I raise difficulties for one anti-reductionist response to the Disjunctive Move, the Explanatory Response.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: University of Notre Dame, USA, E-mail: jaworski.9@nd.edu

Publication date: 2002-04-01