A New Solution to Moore's Paradox

Author: Gillies A.S.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 105, Number 3, September 2001 , pp. 237-250(14)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddness against the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions to the problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But ``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours in different semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriate only if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning with truth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate when it comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory which accounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals (Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary. It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lense of an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA E-mail: agillies@u.arizona.edu

Publication date: 2001-09-01