The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism

Author: Levy K.1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 105, Number 2, August 2001 , pp. 107-127(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessary for free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) that my being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary for free will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimate self-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USC Libertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, no metaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception of ultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivating the USC Libertarian is ultimately impossible to fulfill.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Columbia Law School, New York, USA E-mail: kml56@columbia.edu

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